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Abstract- The emergence of flexible supply chain systems 
(FSC) has sparked increased interest in real-time planning, 
scheduling, and logistics--with particular consideration for 
strategic implications and overall cost control.  Important 
aspects of an FSC include forecasting, production, materials 
handling, transportation, and distribution center inventory.  
There exists a variety of software applications for addressing 
tactical issues, such as adaptive scheduling, and short term 
forecasting.  However, these programs typically do not permit 
the user to assess the strategic implications of different policies 
for flexing capacity and making alternative commitments to 
manufacturing plants.  Recently there has been increased 
interest in the use of simulation models for strategic policy 
analysis. Simulation compares favorably to purely analytical 
methods that often fail to capture the complex interactions of a 
particular FSC.  The challenge is to create an FSC 
simulation model that is general enough and flexible 
enough to allow the user to analyze the overall costs and 
benefits of different policies.  This paper presents just 
such an FSC model, implemented in a system dynamics 
modeling language.  The model is specifically designed to 
help the user evaluate different policies for scheduling 
production in the factories and policies that govern 
factory capacity…in terms of their impact on overall 
production cost and inventory turns.  Preliminary 
results include new insights regarding the conventional 
wisdom that minimizing the incremental amount that a 
factory can fluctuate at any given point in tam will 
reduce cost.  The model suggests the contrary, that 
requiring larger fluctuations actually reduces the 
frequency and overall magnitude of the changes without 
adverse impact on factory utilization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of flexible supply chain systems (FSC) 
has sparked increased interest in real-time planning, 
scheduling, and logistics--with particular consideration for 
strategic implications and overall cost control [9].  
Important aspects of an FSC include forecasting, 
production, materials handling, transportation, and 
distribution center inventory [14]. Strategic activities focus 
on setting integrated global policies and contract 
negotiations. Real-time activities primarily refer to weekly 
operations that require efficient, timely, and adaptive 
responses to customer expectations, short-term 
scheduling, and execution concerns [6]. There are a 
variety of software applications that provide visibility and 
control of the tactical issues. What is lacking are tools for 
assessing the efficacy of global strategic policies 
including capacity planning, phased commitment to 
manufacturing, transportation, and distribution center 
inventory management.  
Recently there has been increased interest in the use 
of simulation for evaluating policies for real-time 
planning, operational control, adaptive scheduling and 
planning, and forecasting [14]. The use of simulation 
appears to compare favorably to purely analytical 
methods that often fail to capture the complex interactions 
of a particular FSC[5] and is well established in the 
literature as highly applicable in operations and strategic 
management [4,8,10]. Applying simulation as a real-time 
tool requires insight into the role of the simulation model 
within the overall FSC [7]. The challenge is to find a way 
to represent in an operational model the problems and 
decision-making requirements for an FSC so that one may 
assess the costs and benefits of various policies or 
business process changes which would provide managers 
with a powerful tool which can be used to provide direct 
competitive advantage [5,15]. This paper presents a 
system dynamics-based flexible supply chain model for 
evaluating different capacity planning policies and 
analyzing their impact on overall production cost. 
 
II. STRATEGY AND EXPECTATIONS 
A. Objective 
Our objective is to determine a cost optimal 
aggregate factory load policy (AFLP) that enables high 
customer satisfaction and responsive to demand swings 
and perturbations.  We have chosen to focus on factory 
capacity (equals production capacity) since it is key to 
cost control, customer satisfaction, and efficient resource 
utilization [11]. Cost is defined to be a combination of 
real cost and shadow cost for the full supply chain from 
demand forecast through to the customer.  Shadow cost is 
used in the case when observed prices fail to accurately 
reflect the social value of a good, or prices do not exist at 
all.  Aggregate factory load is a function of usage, available 
capacity, and throughput. 
B. System Components  
We will use five major supply chain components:  (1) 
demand, (2) build, (3) transportation, (4) distribution 
centers (DC), and (5) Customer [3]. The major 
components are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Major Components of the Supply Chain 
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The components of a supply chain can be clustered into 
three different categories based on the level of control that 
the manufacturing companies can exercise; (1) no control, 
(2) tactical control, and (3) strategic control. 
 
(1) No control is defined as having at best limited 
reactionary control over the parameters involved, and 
includes actual demand and customer satisfaction. 
Demand is the driver of all actions within the supply 
chain.  Although significant effort is placed on 
forecasting, the forecast does not drive the factory, 
actual demand does.  Thus, the creation of a flexible 
supply chain that can react to the fluctuations and 
perturbations in demand is one of the keys to success. 
(2) Tactical control refers to supply chain activities that 
can quickly respond to changing short-term situations.  
Mode of transportation is the only component of this 
type considered in our model. 
(3) Finally, there are aspects of the manufacturing that are 
flexible, but only within specified predetermined 
parameters that are dictated by corporate policy or pre-
negotiated contracts. These are classified as strategic 
control components. Two examples are Factory 
capacity and distribution center (DC) capacity.  For 
example, a factory could be prepared to manufacture 
10,000 units per week, but if they worked double or 
triple shifts they could manufacture as much as 18,000 
units.  However, to manufacture more than 18,000 
units they would need to physically add manufacturing 
machines and train additional labor.  Similarly, if the 
factory is prepared to manufacture 10,000 units per 
week and only receives a request for 3,000 units, 
sectors of the factory would have to shut down thereby 
eroding the factories projected revenue, potentially to 
the point that the factory would need to close. 
III. FSC SIMULATION MODEL 
Many large companies are structured such that each 
individual component of the supply chain works to produce 
optimum results within its sector at a tactical level. For 
example, logistics will try to reduce airfreight while 
manufacturing will try and level load the factories resulting 
in an increase in airfreight.  However, we will be presenting 
an integrated or strategic model representing the interaction 
amongst the sectors [12] and aid in policy evaluation that 
will improve customer satisfaction and reduce overall 
supply chain cost [13]. Of the two factors that are able to be 
controlled strategically, factory and DC capacity, DC 
capacity is significantly more difficult to change than 
factory capacity because a substantial change in DC 
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capacity requires a DC to be bought or sold thus having 
significant capital dollar impact. 
Therefore, for our model, DC capacity will be 
considered to be static.  Factory capacity, however, can be 
renegotiated as often as quarterly without significant capital 
expenditure.  The objective of the model is to determine the 
appropriate level of carrying capacity in the factories that 
will (1) support the required manufacturing plan, (2) 
preserve the financial viability of the factories, (3) maintain 
DC inventory turns at an appropriate level, and (4) reduce 
overall supply chain cost.   
Inputs for the model are demand, initial average 
factory capacity, average DC capacity, and eventually cost.  
Demand is based on the company’s historical demand over a 
one year time period.  Demand includes future orders, two 
weeks of safety stock, and at once orders collected for all 
demand regions and submitted once per month. Initial 
factory capacity is set based on the average factory capacity 
negotiated by the company in the previous year.  Similarly, 
DC capacity is set to the current DC capacity for the 
company. There are three sub-models that track factory cost, 
transportation cost, and the DC costs.  
The model allows the user to observe the tactical 
supply chain events based on demand.  The primary control 
of the system will be the Flex Policy.  Flex policy dictates 
the increase or decrease of factory capacity.  Flex Policy can 
either be incorporated as a dynamic feedback loop based on 
predefined balance of Factory Cost and DC Inventory Cost 
or it can be adjusted manually by the user.   
The assumed reference behavior pattern (RBP) is that 
the system will come to a steady state at a point when the 
factory capacity is sufficient to meet the demand needs and 
the cost impact within the feedback loop considering both 
the cost to the factory and the cost of DC inventory is 
acceptable.  It is also hypothesized that when the overall 
system is optimal, the subsystems may in fact, not be 
optimal. 
 
• DC Inventory costs 
o Build risk and cost of closeout 
o Preorder risk and cost of unused materials 
o Storage cost  
o Inventory turns 
IV. MODEL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Factory Considerations 
The ideal situation from the factory’s sustainability 
perspective would be for the factories to be level loaded at 
some specified capacity.  Realistically, based on demand 
fluctuations, the factories are loaded based on a leveling 
process that ensures on time production to meet demand and 
considers that factories can flex from a baseline value to 
upper and lower capacity limits.  The impact of flex can be 
categorized in terms of the increment and timeframe 
associated.  Considerations were developed based on in 
depth interviews with several major factory groups 
primarily in SE Asia such as Indonesia, South Korea, 
Taiwan and China. 
• Flex up or down of Y percent from the baseline 
does not involve significant cost, only the 
incremental cost of productivity and is valid only 
for duration of time ti for factories i = 1,, n. 
• Flex up or down of greater than Y percent from the 
baseline involves adding workers/lines or removing 
workers/lines respectively and comes at a much 
more significant cost and is a permanent change. 
• Flex costs to be considered 
a. Overhead & Capital, Labor, Worker Moral 
b. Shadow cost of worker moral is important  
c. Transition cost of flex does not appear to be a 
consideration. 
• Future considerations would be to consider that the 
factories may be grouped with respect to the 
relationships and impacts of flexing.   Model Requirements: • Underutilizing capacity impacts meeting a 
company’s initiative insofar as throughput 
increases and reduction in overhead costs. 
• Continued economic support of the factories 
• Production of supply to meet demand in a timely 
manner 
• Maintain high inventory turns B. Transportation Considerations • Demand has significant spikes 
• Factories should be level loaded Standard Ocean transportation is the most cost effective 
specifically with respect to transit cost. However, in some 
cases airfreight transportation is used to reduce time to DC 
as significant increased cost.  The decision to use airfreight 
can be made just prior to the finished goods reaching the 
consolidators.  Most often, however, the airfreight decision 
is made just before manufacturing begins. 
• Inventory turn penalties 
• Carrying cost of factories 
Cost Considerations: 
• Air Freight cost 
• Factory Costs 
o Unused capacity costs 
o Exceeding capacity costs 
o Flex up and flex down cost to factories 
o Production costs – tooling cost 
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C. DC Considerations 
DC capacity is fairly static in that the acquisition of 
additional space is expensive to purchase or rent, as is the 
cost of preparing the internal structures that are conducive to 
displaying and tracking the large number of stock keeping 
units (SKUs).  The most likely scenario when the DCs have 
reached capacity is to leave the product sitting in the yard 
and prioritize container unloading.  The product in the yard 
is included in the DC turn calculation. 
The turn rate at the DC is impacted by the volume and 
variety of inventory. The closer to capacity and the more 
variety the longer it will take process and move inventory 
out of the DC and to the customer.  For example, during the 
low season (Fall), the DCs are only loaded to 70% capacity 
with reduced variety of SKUs.  Hence, the DC has more 
space to create pick faces and more space to maneuver 
machinery to pack and ship the inventory to the customer, 
so it takes less time. 
V. MODEL LOGIC 
The model can be thought of in terms of three major 
sections (1) demand, (2) manufacturing, and (3) logistics.  
These components together represent the entire supply 
chain.  Flexibility to alter policy is built into the model in 
the form of various parameters that are controlled by the 
user.  A high-level causal loop diagram, shown in Diagram 
1, consists of three feed back loops.  All loops serve to 
increase revenue.  The left most loop depicts the 
requirement of prebuilding as the forecast increases, 
however, prebuild creates excess inventory inherent with the 
risk of building before actual confirmed orders are placed.  
The center loop depicts the impact to orders requiring 
expedited manufacturing and airfreight due to insufficient 
factory capacity.  The final loop to the right depicts the 
changes to the factory capacity required based on number of 
orders. 
 
Diagram 1:  Causal Loop Diagram 
 
 
 
A. Demand 
The demand section of this model depicted in Figure 2 is 
designed to take in the actual demand request from the 
customer, and the flow of demand into a queue 
representing the requests for product to be manufactured.  
In most retail companies, the demand is driven by the 
customers and will therefore be considered exogenous. 
The demand flows into a rectangular box called the 
scheduling queue until it is determined when it will need 
to be scheduled for manufacturing.  The factories would 
prefer to build product at a steady rate, to be level loaded.  
If this were the case, the factories would be able adjust 
their capacity to a constant value, and would no longer 
have the additional cost of unused capacity or the high 
cost of overtime production.  However, demand is not 
constant, but rather has peaks and valleys based on the 
season, economy, and the product offering.  Thus, after the 
demand is sent to scheduling queue the decision needs to be 
made how to schedule the production, either as early 
production (prebuild), standard production, or rush 
production.  
Demand will flow as early production at a constant 
percentage of demand inflow unless the factories are being 
underutilized.  In this case, more demand can flow out of the 
queue as additional prebuild.  Prebuild represents schedule 
placed into the manufacturing queue before the actual orders 
are approved.  There is risk associated with prebuild in 
terms of possibly building the wrong product or excess 
product, if it turns out that product is not demanded in the 
actual orders.  Therefore it is important to control the 
amount of allowable prebuild, and how far in advance of 
receiving actual orders prebuild can be scheduled.  Prebuild 
is controlled by three user controllable parameters:  (1) the
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Figure 2:  Demand Flow 
 
 
 
Key:  F    Physical or logical storage  Flow into or out of storage   Information transfer 
 
 
amount of demand inflow that can be prebuilt on a routine 
basis, (2) the amount of demand that can be prebuilt if the 
factories are being underutilized, and (3) number of 
weeks in advance of receiving actual orders that prebuild 
can be scheduled.   
The demand that does not flow into the 
manufacturing schedule as prebuild is scheduled as 
standard production unless the standard production 
schedule is full.  Standard production is manufacturing 
the schedule X weeks in advance of when it is needed, 
based on actual orders being received, material lead times, 
ocean transit times, and the amount of allowable 
inventory in the DCs.  Any product placed in the schedule 
less than X weeks in advance of when it is needed must 
be shipped by a faster mode of transportation in order to 
deliver the product on time to the customer. 
If the factory schedule for standard and prebuild 
production is full and there is remaining demand in the 
schedule queue, some of the demand will flow directly 
into the immediate schedule, called rush in the model.  In 
this case, when the entire production schedule is full, the 
amount of airfreight increases.  This is modeled by 
computing the percentage of schedule being added as 
rush, and then lagging this figure to reflect the delay 
between adding the schedule and when it is actually 
shipped to the DC.  
B. Manufacturing 
The manufacturing section of the model is a 
simplification of the true manufacturing process.  With 
the passage of time, prebuild schedule is becoming 
current schedule, modeled as a flow from prebuild to 
current.  At the same time, the current schedule is 
becoming immediate schedule, modeled as a flow from 
current to immediate.  Actual production is represented as 
a flow, labeled producing, from the immediate schedule to 
factory inventory, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Manufacturing Time Windows 
 
 
 
To specify the model logic mathematically, let X be the 
standard lead-time for production, in weeks, and the Y be 
the length of the current scheduling period, also in weeks.  
Assuming that factory capacity is available, product 
demanded at time t can be scheduled for standard 
production at time t – (X + Y/2). For example, let’s assume 
that today’s date is December 1, 2002, that a customer 
requests product by March 1, 2003, and that standard lead-
time for product is one month plus or minus 1 week.  The 
current schedule is represented by the factory’s capacity 
available for the weeks of January 27, 2002 through 
February 10, 2003.  The total amount in the current schedule 
would be the factory’s weekly capacity times three, since 
standard production for the December demand can be built 
in any of the three aforementioned weeks. 
Now let the number of weeks for prebuild equal one, 
and the percent of prebuild equal to 10% of demand. Then, 
ten percent of the demand requested at time t will be 
scheduled for manufacture at time t – 1 – (X + Y/2), or one 
week prior to the standard production time. 
As time passes, the prebuild schedule will flow into the 
standard production window for demand requested for 
delivery at time t+1, thereby consuming capacity in the 
standard production window for demand for time t+1.  
Hence, the current schedule consists of both standard 
production plus prebuild from previous time periods.  
Figure 4 shows the model for scheduling and manufacturing 
in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 4: Demand and Manufacturing 
 
 
The amount of product that the factory can manufacture 
at any given time is determined by the factory weekly 
capacity. The company requesting product to be built by the 
factory will negotiate some initial level of capacity that it 
believes will be needed, this parameter is the initial capacity 
for the factory.  However, if the demand increases or 
decreases significantly the factories can accommodate this 
change within limits.  Figure 5 depicts the section of the 
model that determines the factory weekly capacity. 
The logic for adding capacity is as follows.  First, 
current + immediate schedule is computed.  If this total 
exceeds the current Factory Weekly Capacity times the sum 
of the length of the two queues by more than a specified 
percentage, then “adding capacity” is triggered.  Capacity 
does not increase immediately; rather, it increases after a 
specified number of weeks.  Additional capacity increases 
are not allowed to be triggered during the waiting period.  
The logic for capacity reductions is similar, with parameters 
being specified for the percentage below capacity that 
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Figure 5: Factory Capacity 
 
 
 
triggers a reduction and the wait period for a reduction 
(these might or might not be the same as for additions). 
C. Logistics 
The remainder of the logistic flow is quite simple.  The 
factory can produce what is in the schedule at the rate 
determined by the factories capacity to produce.  The 
standard ocean vessel will ship the factory production unless 
it was scheduled for rush production, then it will be shipped 
by a more expensive mode, airfreight.  The product, either 
arrives by air or ocean transportation into the DC yard and is 
taken into the DC as inventory.  The inventory is relieved 
from the DC at the rate of demand less the average 
manufacturing lead-time.  Figure 6 shows this logic in 
diagram form. 
 
 
Figure 6: Logistics 
Factory
 Inventory Yard
 Inventory
Ocean
Transit
Shipping by Air
Ship by
Ocean
Ocean freight 
arriving at Yard
Shipments
to Customers
Yard to DC
DC 
Inventory
Figire 6: Logistics
 
 
Costs in the model accrue as production takes place.  
For production costs, the cost/unit depends on how close the 
production rate matches capacity.  Costs are higher when 
the production rate is above capacity due to the incremental 
cost of overtime and other factors.  Costs are also hight 
when production rate is below capacity due to fixed costs 
and shadow costs.  Transportation cost depends on how 
much airfreight is required.  The DC costs are computed as 
a function of DC turns.  When DC turns are high, the DC 
contribution to cost per unit is lower, and vice versa.  Total 
cost per unit is the sum of these three components. 
D. Control Panel 
There are ten controls that the users can adjust in order to 
reflect various policies or process anticipated to change.  
• Initialization – initial demand. 
• Total Leadtime – average number of weeks to produce 
and ship product to the DC. 
• Length of Current Schedual inWeeks – Average 
amount of time requred to order raw materials. 
• Flex Amount – amount of change in factory capacity 
required when a capacity change is warrented. 
• Short term flex – amount the factory can change its 
capacity by simply working overtime. 
• Average weeks of prebuild – number of weeks in 
advance of actual orders product can be built. 
• Factory Up Flex – the amount of over utilization that 
can occur before the factory has to initiate a change in 
capacity. 
• Factory Down Flex – the amount of under utilization 
that can occur before the factory has to initiate a change 
in capacity.  
• Fraction of schedual Queue loaded as prebuild to utilize 
fcty – amount of product allowed to be built before 
actual orders exist. 
• Fcty Initial Capapcity – initial factory capacity 
E. Example Model Run 
The objective of the model is to enable compainies to 
evaluate differenent policies and their potential impact.  In 
this example run we have the parameters set to ones that 
represent industry norms. 
Figure 9 shows a step increase in demand.  
Accordingly, the amount of prebuild increases, as does the 
amount of schedule flowing in as standard.  When the 
schedule queue becomes “full” at about week 20, some of 
the schedule flows directly into the immediate schedule, as 
rush (shown as vertical stripe, since this flow is normal 
zero).  Shortly thereafter, the rush ceases, because the 
reduced demand inflow allows the schedule to empty 
somewhat.  The full schedule has triggered an increase in 
capacity as well, which come on line about week 28, 
allowing the production rate to step up at that time.  At 
about week 30, the demand drops another notch for a few 
weeks.  As shown in  
Figure 10, the overall schedule changes in a less dramatic 
fashion. Figure 11 shows the demand changes, and when the 
factory capacity changes in response to these demand 
changes.  The production rate is also shown for reference, as 
the amount shipping via ocean and via air (minimal in this 
scenario).
 
Figure 9: Model Response to Step Changes in Demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Impact on Schedules 
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Figure 11:  Impact on Producing, Shipping, and Capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. MODEL TESTING 
The model was initially calibrated in steady state to verify 
that all the parameters were synchronized.  Then simple 
changes in the demand profile were entered and the response 
of the model monitored.  Various parameters were adjusted, 
one at a time, to verify that the change in response was 
appropriate.  Extreme values were also tested in order to 
determine the limits of validity of the model—the conditions 
under which the model breaks down and becomes unrealistic 
and cannot be used for policy analysis 
VII. POLICY ANALYSIS 
There are two primary objectives for any supply chain to 
consider, cost and customer satisfaction [2]. Using this model 
we assume the latter, that is, we must produce what is 
requested by when the customer needs it. Then, we consider 
various policies to determine the most cost efficient way to 
accomplish the aforementioned objective.  The three most 
significant costs in the supply chain are the DC inventory 
turns, factory capacity, and airfreight. Evaluation a policy to 
reduce cost must be based on the relative cost of each of these 
three components and a balancing between the three.  Ideally, 
the DC inventory turns would remain as close to 5.5 as 
possible, factory capacity and utilization would remain 
constant, and airfreight would hold steady between three or 
four percent. 
We have run two primary scenarios.  The first scenario 
uses parameter settings that cause the factory capacity to 
fluctuate with the demand, whereas the second seeks to better 
stabilize the factory capacity. 
A. Simulation Test Scenarios 
The first scenario represents what is typically done in 
industry, the factory capacity and the flex policy attempts to 
closely follow demand. The hypothesis is that the capacity 
will flex frequently and ultimately lead to significant under 
and over utilization of the factories.  The threshold that 
triggers the factories to flex capacity and the amount that the 
capacity changes is set to 5% up or down at a given time, 
factories are allowed to flex overall as much as necessary. The 
model indicates that when the factories operate this way they 
end up flexing very frequently, as one might expect.  Even so, 
the factories still have ongoing factory over and under 
utilization issues. Overall costs are significant since a cost is 
incurred each time the factory must change capacity, as well 
as the cumulative cost of the under and over utilization of the 
factories.  The outcome is shown in Figure 12.  DC turns 
increase initially due to the increased demand coupled with the 
requisite delay in the associated inventory increase.  Only a 
small amount of airfreight is needed.  The large fluctuation in 
DC turns is not desired, nor is the persistent over and under 
utilization of the factories, so alternative policies are explored. 
Scenario two is more conservative regarding the addition 
or reduction of factory capacity.  The hypothesis is that less 
frequent changes in factory capacity will lead to less over and 
under utilization of the factories.  The factory production still 
follows demand, but is required to flex up and down 
approximately 15% at each interval. The model shows that 
factory capacity is more stable, but surprisingly, the overall 
under and over utilization is approximately the same as in the 
previous scenario.  Thus, the cost incurred in this scenario 
would be less due to the reduced number of times the factory 
must change capacity, with comparable overall under and over 
factory utilization. See Figure 13 for a graphical 
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Figure 12: Scenario 1, Factory Capacity Follows Demand Fluctuation (two plots) 
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representation of the cost components.  DC turns and 
airfreight were not significantly different from scenario 1. 
DC turns increased initially due to the increased demand 
coupled with the requisite delay in the associated inventory 
increase.  Only a small amount of airfreight was needed. 
B. Lessons Learned 
The outcomes of various policies can be quite dramatic 
[1]. We have demonstrated only one of many situations that 
could be evaluated for impact.  The specific objective of this 
simulation was to create a flexible supply chain model for 
evaluating different capacity planning policies and 
analyzing their impact on overall production cost.  The 
current model allows the user to input various parameters 
that control capacity, scheduling, and the production of 
goods.  The user can then evaluate the outcomes associated 
with the parameter settings.  For example, a user could input 
parameters that would not allow the factory capacity to 
change.   
The impact to factory capacity utilization, mode of 
transportation and DC inventory turns will be readily 
available. A full cost benefit analysis could be performed on  
 
  
Figure 13: Scenario 2, Stable Factory Capacity at a Lower Level (two plots) 
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each of the outcomes, and fact-based decisions could be 
made regarding the best policies to invoke. 
 Specifically, from the scenarios that we ran, we 
determined that the traditional policy, which states that the 
factories should flex as little as possible at any one time, in 
order to mitigate overall under and over utilization and to 
control cost may not be the best policy.  Based on the 
model, and it does seem reasonable, requiring larger 
changes in factory capacity overall achieves the desired 
outcome of reducing overall cost. The model has provided 
significant information as to the potential impact of 
particular policies and their respective outcomes. It is 
evident that simulation can be a valuable tool for evaluating 
FSC various policies and their associated outcomes.     
C. Next Steps 
The next steps for the model will be to incorporate 
feedback from the DC turn rate to upstream aspect such as 
scheduling and production rates. This will aid in the 
determination of attractive policies that not only consider 
the cost at the factory, but also factors in the cost of 
fluctuating DC inventory. 
A second consideration for the model will be to include 
additional costing components to allow the user to enter the 
relative or real costs associated with each aspect of the 
model.  It is intended that the costing components will 
directly impact scheduling and production processes and aid 
in determining the most cost effective manufacturing 
parameters for balancing the tradeoffs between factory 
capacity utilization, mode of transportation and DC 
inventory turns.   
APPENDIX 
Reference Behavior Patterns 
This section was prepared before the model was built to 
indicate how the real world actually behaves.  This served as 
a reference during model testing as to whether the model 
behavior was consistent with reality or not. 
1. Current Situation – Start of Spring  (highest volume 
from lowest volume)  
a. Factory averages 7% pre-build  
b. Factory will average 5% late product 
c. Factory average load is 90%  
d. Transportation average air freight is 3.3% 
e. DC inventory turn average 4.4 (want 5.5 – 6) 
f. SKU count at approximately 12,000 
2. Increase Factory capacity by 50% (High season into 
low season – spring into fall) 
a. Factory will average 0 pre-build  
b. Factory will average 0 late product 
c. Factory average load should be 60%  
d. Transportation average air freight should be 
0% 
e. DC inventory turn average should be just over 
3 for the time period lagging the demand by 2 
months. 
f. Sku count consistent 
3. Demand Flux – demand spike after low (holiday into 
spring)  
a. Factory will increase to12% pre-build for 
duration of spike  
b. Factory will increase the amount of late 
product to 7% for duration of spike 
c. Factory average load should not exceed 95%  
d. Transportation average air freight increase 
proportionally with late product 
e. DC inventory turn should increase to about 4.5 
at lag 3 and maybe as high  at lag 5 
f. SKU count consistent 
4. Steady state objectives 
a. Bounded factory flux to reasonable levels – 
strive for level load 
b. Steady DC turns at about 5.6 to 6 
c. Cost efficacy  
In fact, the model does NOT behave exactly as 
described above.  This is due in part due to model 
inadequacies, but is due to the fact that the description of 
reference behavior was based on experience and not factual 
data, so it was not held to be an absolute reference.  
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